



BI.ZONE
Cybersecurity




BI.ZONE
Cybersecurity

Modern cybercrime groups – Characteristics and counteraction

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Statistics

\$1 trillion

damage to the world economy
from cybercrime in 2017

Statistics

~10 million

new types of malware appear
every month

Statistics

~90%

of all e-mail traffic
is spam

Statistics


Malware

Most spam e-mails
are used to distribute malware

Modern cybercriminals –
are not individual hackers



Organized cybercrime group structure



Cyber kill-chain and countermeasures

Stage:

Reconnaissance

Malware development. Obfuscation of executable files

Delivery
(phishing, insider, social engineering)

Exploitation

Attack development

Money theft

Suggested measures:

Monitor Dark Web

Infiltrate non-public forums/communities

Incident response

Clean the network and minimize risks

Investigate the attack



Main targets of cybercriminals



Banks and
other financial institutions




Banks' customers
(Legal entities)




Individuals
(online-banking)


Attacks on banks



Attacks on banks' customers



Attacks on mobile devices



Modern cybercrime groups



Carbanak group

- Appeared in 2013
- Total damage – \$1.2 billion
- Victims - more than 100 banks around the world
- Average one-time theft - \$5 million.
- Team size – about 100 members
- Still active, even after the leader has been detained
- Phishing campaigns ~2 times a month
- Main cash-out method – via ATMs



Carbanak - Characteristics

The screenshot displays the Cobalt Strike interface. The top menu bar includes 'Cobalt Strike', 'View', 'Attacks', 'Reporting', and 'Help'. Below the menu is a toolbar with various icons. The main area shows a network diagram with several nodes representing compromised systems. The nodes are connected by arrows, indicating a network topology. The nodes are labeled as follows:

- 192.168.1.95 (represented by a brick wall icon)
- whatta.hogg WS2 @ 2364
- whatta.hogg * WS2 @ 3248
- SYSTEM * CE0SBOX @ 2324
- SYSTEM * JOSSHDEV @ 180
- SYSTEM * FILESERVER @ 1008
- SYSTEM * BILLING-POWER @ 632
- SYSTEM * JOSSHDEV @ 1536
- SYSTEM * MAIL @ 1384

The diagram shows a central node 'whatta.hogg * WS2 @ 3248' connected to 'whatta.hogg WS2 @ 2364' and 'SYSTEM * CE0SBOX @ 2324'. 'SYSTEM * CE0SBOX @ 2324' is connected to 'SYSTEM * JOSSHDEV @ 180' and 'SYSTEM * FILESERVER @ 1008'. 'SYSTEM * FILESERVER @ 1008' is connected to 'SYSTEM * BILLING-POWER @ 632', 'SYSTEM * JOSSHDEV @ 1536', and 'SYSTEM * MAIL @ 1384'. A red arrow labeled 'DISCONNECTED' points from 'SYSTEM * FILESERVER @ 1008' to 'SYSTEM * JOSSHDEV @ 1536'.

Below the network diagram is a command prompt window titled 'Event Log X Services X Beacon 10.10.10.189@2324 X'. The window shows the following output:

```
[+] host called home, sent: 12 bytes
[+] Impersonated CORP\jim.stevens
beacon> psexec FILESERVER ADMIN$ local - beacon smb
[*] Tasked beacon to run windows/beacon_smb/bind_pipe (\\FILESERVER\pipe\status_9867) on FILESERVER via Service Control Manager (\\FILESERVER\ADMIN$\acbe9e5.exe)
[+] host called home, sent: 208140 bytes
[+] received output:
Started service 19b4243 on FILESERVER
[+] established link to child beacon: 10.10.10.4
beacon> pwd
[*] Tasked beacon to print working directory
[+] host called home, sent: 84 bytes
[*] Current directory is C:\Windows\system32
[CE0SBOX] SYSTEM */2324
beacon>
```

The command prompt window also shows a status bar at the bottom right indicating 'last: 8s'.

Carbanak group

- Actively monitor cybersecurity news
- **1 day** – from new exploit till phishing campaign
- Develop and use their own malware + **Metasploit, Cobalt Strike, Empire, PowerSploit**
- Use **fileless, in-memory malware**



Lazarus group

- Active since 2009
- Numerous attacks at various enterprises
- Sony Pictures hack in 2014
- Money theft from Banks in Ecuador and Vietnam
- Bank of Bangladesh attack in 2016



Lazarus – the attack at Far Eastern International Bank

- Participated in the attack that (Taiwan, 2017) lead to \$60 million of financial losses.
- Threat actors used SWIFT



Lazarus group

- Use company-specific malware
- Use tools to cover tracks – anti-forensics, disk wiping
- Protect malware from analysis using VMProtect, Themida
- Known cash-out methods – SWIFT transfer, casinos



Silence group

- Appeared in 2017
- One more group that is focusing banks in Russian and other countries
- Similar to Carbanak, but develop and use their own malware
- More than 10 banks suffered attacks from this group
- Attack vector – phishing attacks through compromised partner companies.



Buhtrap group

- In operation since 2014
- Used to focus on legal entities
- In 2015 – 2016 attacked small banks in Russia and Ukraine
- Used malware developed inside the group
- Damage done – about \$33 million
- In 2017-2018 switched focus back to legal entities again
- Regularly attack banks' customers in Russia



Buhtrap – typical victims

- Small companies with large cashflow
- Outdated software
- Low competencies of IT-personnel
- Low cybersecurity budgets



Buhtrap – attack methods

- Main attack vectors– **phishing** and **watering hole**
- Phishing e-mails with malicious attachments
- Microsoft Word and Internet Explorer exploits
- Actively use exploit-builder **Microsoft Word Intruder** (MWI), might be connected to its developer
- Take advantage of outdated software



RTM, Dimnie and other

- Different types of malware used to attack banks and their customers in Russia and abroad
- Main distribution method – regular phishing campaigns
- Threat actors send zipped EXE-files counting on low awareness level of victims
- Use same money transfer methods as Buhtrap
- Gain remote access to financial officer computer and create unauthorized payment order or substitute payment details



Dridex group

- Target both companies and individuals
- Active in more than 20 countries with most attacks in USA, UK, Germany
- Damage done ~\$50 million
- Use their own malware – **Dridex** Trojan
- Are constantly improving their tools
- Malware is updated every two weeks



Dridex - Characteristics

- Develop ransomware
- Average ransom – от 20 to 50 BTC
- Try to diversify their business
- Carefully monitor geography of their actions
- Choose attack vectors after the infection



Dridex group

- Distribution methods – phishing campaigns + malicious Microsoft Office files
- Attack online-banking
- Use Web Injects to steal money
- Inject JavaScript in the browser, substituting online-banking interface
- Change payment details and steal user credentials
- Transfer money to fraudulent cards/accounts and cash-out



TrickBot malware

- Similar to Dridex
- Spike of activity in 2017, still active
- Targets customers of more than 300 banks from US, UK, Australia, Germany and Switzerland
- Build using source code of Dyreza banking Trojan
- Is actively upgraded by its developers



TrickBot - characteristics

- Uses compromised IoT-devices
- ~2500 –proxy-devices currently used
- Difficult to block
- In 2017 network worm module added to functionality
- In 2018 added reconnaissance module added to functionality



TrickBot – methods


- Distribution methods– phishing campaigns + malicious attachments
- Steal money via Web Injection are redirect to phishing pages
- Similar to Dridex



Attacks on mobile banking




Attacks on mobile banking – malware



Attacks on mobile banking- Investigations



Investigation methods



Conclusions

- Cybercrime is geographically spread across the world
- Threat actors take advantage of geopolitical turbulence
- It is crucial to raise cybersecurity awareness level
- Legislation needs to be improved
- Most importantly – International cooperation is key in a fight against cybercrime

Contents

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
Modern cybercrime

Organized cybercrime group structure

Attacks on banks

Attacks on bank customers

Mobile threats





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